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Executive Summary
The fact that poor people will resort to violence to 
change the political and economic system that they 
believe is responsible for their poverty is not new. 
The link between poverty, violence, and instability 
has started to figure prominently in the agenda of 
strategic discussions in global fora and national 
governments, sparked by the increased sense of 
threat from terrorism felt by societies in developed 
countries. Analysts seem to agree that poverty, 
combined with a long list of factors, including 
ethnic disparities, social and economic inequalities, 
and resource disputes, can prepare the ground for 
conflict.
Although poverty itself does not cause violent con­
flict, it does provide a basis for it. This case study 
is about the probable link between poverty and 
violent social uprisings in rural Mexico. It illustrates 
how the sudden exacerbation of poverty and exclu­
sion, provoked largely by the implementation of 
market liberalization policies, may have been the 
trigger that led thousands of people to turn to 
violent rebellion against the rule of law, with 
immense and far-reaching social, economic, and 
political costs.
In the early 1990s, coffee-producing populations in 
southern Mexico, already living in poverty and in 
generally marginal conditions, suddenly and simul­
taneously experienced a precipitous reversal of cash 
flows and an alteration in their usual paths of eco­
nomic exchange. These changes resulted partly 
from an institutional change that happened too 
fast. The 1989 collapse of the International Coffee 
Agreement and the 1990 dismantling of the 
Mexican Coffee Institute triggered a sudden drop 
in coffee prices and disarray in domestic coffee 
markets that destabilized the economies of thou­
sands of coffee-producing households.
This case study argues that the suddenness and 
magnitude of the so-called coffee crisis that ensued 
may help explain when, how, and why two para­
military armies with strong backing from the local 
population made their first public and violent 
appearance in the Mexican countryside in the mid- 
1990s. Through this real-life example, this case 
study aims to stimulate thinking about what went 
wrong with policy and discussion on what can be
done, or done better, by stakeholder groups to 
achieve both poverty and stability goals.
The assignment is to identify key lessons learned 
for the design and implementation of government 
action in situations similar to the one described in 
this case.
Introduction
"Poor people will resort to violence ... to change 
the political and economic system that they believe 
is responsible for their poverty" [Ferraro 2003, 6).
The hypothesis posed in this case study is that the 
sudden exacerbation of poverty and exclusion may 
constitute a "trigger" for a people's acceptance of 
violent means and their rebellion against the order 
of law. This case study is about how coffee-pro­
ducing populations in southern Mexico, already 
living in poverty and in generally marginal condi­
tions, suddenly and simultaneously suffered a 
further economic setback. Two simultaneous crises 
destabilized the economies of thousands of coffee- 
producing households. First, producers experienced 
a precipitous reversal of cash flows, partly pro­
voked by an institutional change that happened too 
fast. Second, they faced a drastic alteration in their 
usual paths of economic exchange.
In her 1998 book on the remaking of Mexico's 
economy, Nora Lustig links the rise in rural 
violence in southern Mexico during the 1990s to 
the increased poverty of its inhabitants. This case 
study documents Lustig's assertion and claims that 
this may help explain how and why, during the 
1990s, two paramilitary armies, or guerrillas,1 made
1 The Spanish term guerrilla means "small war." The sense 
in which the term has been used to describe these two 
movements corresponds to Karsner's [2005] definition. 
According to him, the fact that the guerrilla soldier 
selects military and government targets differentiates him 
or her from the "terrorist," who generally selects non- 
combatant civilian and nongovernmental targets for a 
different kind of psychological impact. He cites Robert 
Tabor's book The War o f the Flea [Tabor 1969] to note 
another key distinction between the two: For the 
guerrilla, the local population is the key to the entire
their first public and violent appearance in the 
Mexican countryside. It was the suddenness and the 
magnitude of these two crises that helped trigger 
action by the Ejercito Zapatista de Liberacion 
Nacional [EZLN] in the state of Chiapas and the 
Ejercito Popular Revolucionario [EPR] in the state 
of Oaxaca. Although some authors [such as Cano 
1996 and Pazos 1994] claim that both uprisings were 
the result of manipulation of "susceptible" indig­
enous populations by well-organized groups with 
ulterior, mainly political, motives, this case study 
argues that years of exclusion and poverty pro­
vided fertile soil for this "susceptibility." The cash 
flow and transition crises were the rain that helped 
the latent seed of discontent germinate into a 
supply of willing, if nai've, recruits from the local 
population. If imagining scenarios based on hypo­
thetical counterfactuals is useful, we should ask 
ourselves whether both guerrilla movements, and 
the tremendous social and economic costs they 
imposed, could have been averted had the Mexican 
government made different policy choices. The 
assignment is to identify the "right" policy choices.
Background
Coffee, Poverty, and Wealth
Coffee represents an important source of income 
for some 481,000 Mexican households that culti­
vate 665 ,000  hectares of coffee and hire at least 1 
million laborers annually. It is estimated that some 
3 million mostly rural people are employed in 
activities related to coffee production, processing, 
and sales—approximately 6 percent of the eco­
nomically active population of Mexico and close to 
a quarter of the economically active rural popula­
tion. A labor-intensive crop, coffee grows well on 
small and steeply sloped parcels of land. Small-scale 
producers, often with landholdings smaller than 3 
hectares, constitute the majority of coffee pro­
ducers in the country and are concentrated in 
some of its poorest regions. The major producing
struggle. Karsner quotes Talbot as saying that in guerrilla 
warfare "it is the population that is doing the struggling. 
... A  supportive civilian populace is a guerrilla's 
camouflage, quartermaster, recruiter, communications 
network, and all-seeing intelligence service." The survival 
of a guerrilla movement is entirely dependent upon the 
support of the populace, who provide combat and 
support troops, food, shelter, intelligence, and medical 
support
areas are mountainous, with poor communications 
infrastructure, and some 84 percent of the com­
munities in which coffee is a primary agricultural 
activity have high or very high poverty indexes. 
Sixty percent of coffee producers live in extreme 
poverty, and more than half belong to one of 
Mexico's 52 ethnic groups. Chiapas and Oaxaca, 
two major coffee-producing states, have the lowest 
level of welfare in Mexico.
The situation in Chiapas is archetypical: almost 60 
percent of its population lives in rural areas, almost 
40  percent in housing with earthen floors, and 
more than 22 percent of the population above the 
age of 15 is illiterate [the average for Mexico is less 
than 10 percent]. In Chiapas, coffee is second only 
to corn in terms of cultivated area. It is the state's 
main export crop and the major source of income 
for almost 25 percent of the economically active 
population. Official statistics reveal that in Chiapas 
alone, some 5 0 0 ,0 0 0  people are employed by the 
coffee sector, and of these, 120,000 are coffee 
producers, mostly with landholdings smaller than 2 
hectares [CMC 2004 ; Eakin et al. 2005; 
Hernandez-Navarro and Celis-Rojas 1994; Milford 
2004 ; Perez-Grovas et al. 2001; Style 2001],
Ironically, despite the clear link between poverty 
and coffee, a significant proportion of the harvest 
is exported. Indeed, in 1990, Mexico was the 
fourth-Iargest producer in the world [Renard 1997], 
and coffee exports generated enormous wealth for 
the national economy. That year, coffee was the 
country's third-Iargest source of foreign exchange 
[after petroleum and automobiles], representing 3 
percent of the country's total export earnings and 
42 percent of total agricultural exports [Perez- 
Grovas et al. 2001],
Two major events caused a drastic decline in 
Mexico's strength in the world coffee market, and 
in coffee's strength as foreign exchange earner in 
the Mexican economy. The first was the collapse in 
1989 of the International Coffee Agreement [ICA] 
managed by the International Coffee Organization 
[ICO], and with it, the primary international 
mechanism for controlling world coffee supplies 
and prices.2 Meanwhile, the precipitous fail in world
2 The ICO's cartel-like quota system to maintain world 
coffee prices above a certain level was inevitably followed 
by oversupply and a long-term decline of market 
equilibrium prices. This price decline, plus the difficulty 
of negotiating and ensuring compliance with the
coffee prices was further fueled by Vietnam's 
emergence as a major exporter. Particularly as a 
result of the dismantling of the ICO agreements, 
coffee prices in international markets plummeted 
from an average of US$1.32 a pound in 1986 to 
US$0.53 a pound in 1992 [Lustig 1998],
Second, Mexico simultaneously embarked on an 
ambitious structural reform of agricultural markets 
that reduced state intervention in commodity pro­
duction and marketing. Part of this reform involved 
the dismantling in 1990 of the Mexican Coffee 
Institute [Instituto Mexicano del Cafe, or 
INMECAFE], the parastatal organization that subsi­
dized coffee production and marketing.
The combination of these two events caused what 
has been called "the coffee crisis," owing to the 
dramatic effects that the ensuing drop in prices and 
disarray in domestic coffee markets had on 
Mexico's coffee sector. By 1993, coffee represented 
only 0.6 percent of the country's total export 
earnings and 15 percent of agricultural exports. 
Between 1990 and 2 0 0 4 , coffee production in 
Mexico fell by 21 percent, and exports, by 56 per­
cent. During the same period, coffee export reve­
nues fell 80 percent, from US$450 million in 
1990-1991 to US$250 million in 2 0 0 4  [SourceMex 
2004], The drastic drop in domestic production 
and in exportable coffee reflected the deeper crisis 
faced by coffee producers in rural Mexico.
T he R ise and  Fall of IN M E C A FE  and the 
C offee C risis
Created in 1958, INMECAFE had become the most 
important buyer and seller of coffee in Mexico, and 
for most producers, the only source of credit, 
fertilizers, coffee plants, and technical assistance. At 
its peak, INMECAFE serviced more than 85 
percent of mainly small producers and bought 45 
percent of the country's coffee harvest through a 
network of cooperatives called Unidades 
Economicas de Produccion y Comercializacion 
[UEPCs], Through the UEPCs, the parastatal chan­
neled subsidized credit and inputs and received 
payment in coffee [Renard 1997]. INMECAFE's 
support at the production level and its provision of 
a guaranteed market promoted strong entry of 
small landholders into the coffee sector. Not
agreements, led to cheating and ultimately to the collapse 
of the system [Brandt 1991; Krivonos 2004].
surprisingly, INMECAFE's presence induced the 
expansion of coffee plantations into lowland areas 
that were inadequate for the production of high- 
quality coffee. Indeed, although INMECAFE 
reduced its support levels starting in 1982 owing to 
an economywide crisis, the number of UEPCs and 
members continued to grow [Perez-Grovas et al. 
2001],
INMECAFE was dissolved in 1989-1990, with the 
aim of removing market inefficiencies created by 
the parastatal and of eliminating the agency's ram­
pant corruption [Serrano 1998].3 For the next three 
years, public sector intervention in the Mexican 
coffee sector was limited to transferring 
INMECAFE's infrastructure to the surviving 
UEPCs. The system of guaranteed prices disap­
peared with the agency, coffee export permits were 
eliminated, and customs requirements were simpli­
fied, effectively "freeing" the domestic coffee 
market.
This sudden collapse of the state-controlled pro­
duction-processing-marketing pyramid exposed 
small producers to the vagaries and easy exploita­
tion common in other commodity markets.4 Under 
INMECAFE, producers did not participate in mar­
keting or processing and were completely depend­
ent on the expertise of INMECAFE [Milford 
2004], Without transport, processing facilities, 
financing, or knowledge of markets, the average 
Mexican coffee producer did well to sell his coffee 
harvest to the middleman [co yo te , in local parlance] 
who had a vehicle and could pay cash. The negotia­
tions tended to be one-sided. Producers had no 
information on world coffee prices, to which 
domestic prices are indexed.5 * Even the scales were 
often "loaded," according to many producers' first­
hand accounts [Perez-Grovas et al. 2001], Further­
more, although many international coffee market­
ing and processing companies initially established 
offices in coffee-producing regions and attempted 
to take the place of INMECAFE as buyers and
3 INM ECAFE disappeared, along with the state-run 
Aseguradora Nacional Agricola y Ganadera, which 
provided insurance to producers against crop losses.
4 The continued overvaluation of the Mexican peso also 
contributed to a deterioration of the terms of trade for 
coffee producers [Gilly 1995],
5 Domestic coffee prices, at which coffee exporters buy 
from middlemen and sell in domestic and export 
markets, closely follow daily coffee "Contract C" spot
prices quoted by the New York Board of Trade.
credit providers, they soon disappeared. The few 
left behind charged oligopolic interest rates and 
fixed prices based on their oligopsonic position 
(Renard 1997],
Funes (1992) estimates that by June 1992, because of 
the disarray in global and domestic markets, farm 
prices for coffee in Mexico had fallen by more than 
50 percent with respect to 1989, to levels often 
below average production costs, severely affecting 
the rural economy in coffee-growing areas (Figure 
I). With such low prices, and without the credit to 
purchase inputs and carry out required plantation 
maintenance, productivity per hectare slumped by 
50 percent from 1989 to 1993. Producers reacted 
to the crisis with cost-saving strategies: reducing 
maintenance activities drastically and harvesting 
their plots only partially. Both strategies reduced 
yields (and quality] in present and future crop 
cycles, exacerbating the income-reducing effects of 
the exogenous drop in the price of coffee. Indeed, 
many producers simply decided not to harvest. O f 
the 7 6 0 ,0 0 0  hectares planted in coffee, only 
5 6 0 ,0 0 0  were harvested in 1993 (Perez-Grovas et 
al. 2001). According to Gilly (1995), thousands of 
coffee producers abandoned their farms between 
1989 and 19936
Among the hardest hit by the coffee crisis were 
producers in indigenous communities in the south-
6 The effects of the coffee crisis and the downward spiral 
that it created for coffee producers has been 
documented by Batz et al. (2005) for Oaxaca and by 
Flores et aI. (2002) for Mexico. Statistics presented for 
Mexico by Flores et al. show that the crisis hit 
production mainly through a reduction in yields (which 
dropped at an average annual rate of 9.8 percent from 
1990 to 1995, while the area even increased slightly. A  
key finding from numerical simulation modeling by Batz 
et al. was that a coffee grower's decision to abandon his 
or her farm is typically the last stage of a long downturn 
touched off by a decline in coffee prices. When prices 
fall, many growers migrate to cities after harvest season 
to supplement their incomes, in doing so, they forgo 
important farm maintenance, such as pruning coffee 
plants after harvest. As a result, the yields from coffee 
plants decline significantly in the next season. Lower 
yields imply growers will again need to find off-farm 
work and will again forgo maintenance, in this way, bad 
prices in one year can set in motion a downward spiral of 
falling incomes and yields. Eventually, coffee yields drop 
so low that growers are forced to clear trees to grow 
subsistence crops and, ultimately, to abandon their 
plantations.
east and the south of Mexico. Lustig (1998) claims 
that "it is reasonable to attribute" the rise in 
poverty in these regions to the behavior of coffee 
prices in the early 1990s. Serrano (1998) and Harvey 
(1994) document the case of Chiapas. The effects of 
the sudden dismantling of a state support apparatus 
that been in place for five decades and that had 
created a dependent population was worsened by 
plummeting international coffee prices and by a 
1988 law that severely restricted forestry in the 
state. According to these authors, these events 
provoked a drop in household incomes of 65 
percent by 1993, deprived producers of traditional 
coffee-marketing channels, and severely restricted 
the supply of credit. The number of producers eli­
gible to receive credit went from 20.4 percent in 
1985-1989 to 12.7 percent in 1990, and credit 
reached only 5.7 percent of producers, usually the 
large ones. Furthermore, in her article on the 
Chiapas uprising, Darlington (1995) suggests that 
seasonal workers were the hardest hit by the drop 
in the demand for labor caused by the coffee 
crisis.7
The situation in Oaxaca was no different. Cano 
(1996) reports that between 1989 and 1994 coffee 
prices dropped by 60 percent in that state, affect­
ing at least 55 ,000  coffee-producing households 
with 180,000 hectares of coffee.
Coffee and Stability
Guadarrama (1992) quotes the following statement 
by President Cesar Gaviria of Colombia during a 
meeting about drug traffic in Dallas, Texas: "The 
underlying issue regarding world coffee quotas is 
the consideration, on the part of the United States, 
of the potential impact of their removal on the 
political stability of Central America and the level 
of drug production and drug traffic in Colombia, 
both issues of national security." Indeed, according 
to Renard (1997), stability was the key motive 
behind the establishment of the quota system as 
the basis for International Coffee Agreements. The 
idea of maintaining world coffee prices above a 
certain level by limiting globally traded supplies 
originated during the Cold War years that followed
7 Indeed, an important part of the crisis may also have 
had to do with an internal labor market collapse, as large 
coffee fincas responded by decreasing the demand for 
farm labor, eliminating an important source of off-farm 
income for the rural population.
Figure 1: H istorical Coffee Prices fo r Oaxaca, M exico, 1989-2003
Year
Source: Batz et al. 2005
Note: Prices are given in constant 2000 Mexican pesos per quintal [100 pounds] of parchment coffee. Parchment coffee 
results from de-pulping coffee cherries. The parchment-like skin needs to be removed to produce the green coffee sold in 
international markets.
World War II, as part of the U.S. “Alliance for 
Progress" strategy in Latin America. In this stra­
tegic plan, high and stable coffee prices would pro­
vide incomes and stability to producers in Latin 
America, preventing the rise of communist move­
ments akin to the Cuban Revolution.
The Ejercito Popular Rovolucionario (EPR)
Depending on the source, reports Cano [1996], 
between 40  and 100 g u errille ro s participated in the 
attack on police headquarters at La Crucesita, a 
town next to the Bahlas de Huatulco tourist resort 
in the state of Oaxaca, in September 1996. The 
police station in the town of Tlaxiaco, in the 
Oaxaca's Mixteca region, just bordering the south­
ern coffee-producing mountain ridge known as the 
Sierra Sur, had been attacked two hours earlier, 
along with police offices in the city of Oaxaca, the 
state's capital. In Cano's words, "local authorities 
fear that entire communities in the coffee-produc­
ing Sierra Sur of Oaxaca, where 9 out of 10 people 
are poor or very poor, are backing the EPR." He 
reports that after the attack on La Crucesita, the 
guerrillas fled to a coffee region known as
Loxichas, where some of the detained confessed 
they were from.
The Ejercito Zapatista de LiberacicSn 
Nacional (EZLN)
Because the EZLN movement happened first, was 
much larger, had a successful global media strategy, 
and had a significant impact on Mexico socially, 
politically, and economically, it has captured much 
more attention and been more widely studied than 
the EPR. Many of those who have tried to under­
stand the origins of zapatism o mention the coffee 
crisis as a trigger [Altamirano-Fajardo 2003; Collier 
1994; Mestries-Benquet 2001; Darlington 1995; Gilly 
1995; Perez-Grovas et al. 2001], Mestries-Benquet's 
description is particularly interesting. According to 
him, the coffee crisis provoked the dissolution of 
incipient producer organizations and "an exodus 
toward the Zapatista movement" [Mestries-Benquet 
2001, 121]. Furthermore, he says, coffee producers 
identified with the Zapatista cause, which associated 
the coffee crisis with the free market policies that 
closed INMECAFE. The North American Free 
Trade Agreement [NAFTA] that Mexico had just 
negotiated with Canada and the United States was
seen as the culmination of those policies, and this is 
why the Zapatistas chose to come out publicly on 
January 1 ,1994, the day NAFTA came into effect.
Policy Issues
Two policy questions seem especially relevant for 
the case at hand and are addressed separately here:
1. Why did Mexican government officia ls not imple­
ment effective policies to prevent the coffee crisis, or 
at least diminish its impact on poor coffee producers?
Although policy makers in Mexico were justified in 
questioning INMECAFE's existence, closing it 
down was not the only, or necessarily the best, 
alternative. Krivonos [2004] mentions that coffee 
growers in developing countries have historically 
received a very small share of the export price of 
coffee and that a key culprit has been government 
intervention in the sector. Her research shows that 
government regulation of domestic markets, in the 
form of fixed producer prices and monopsony 
power of marketing boards, has created a signifi­
cant wedge between producer prices and the world 
price of coffee, imposing an implicit tax on pro­
ducers. Export taxes to raise government revenue 
have burdened producers, who have also been 
swayed by "low" but stable guaranteed prices. 
Additionally, Brandt [1991] reports that the coffee 
and exchange rate policies of almost all producing 
countries have reduced real producer prices by 
more than 50 percent below world market parity 
level [world market price at an undistorted 
exchange rate, minus marine freight and domestic 
transformation costs], INMECAFE also crowded 
out private market agents and promoted resource 
use distortions by encouraging expansion of pro­
duction into marginal lands with no real compara­
tive advantage for the crop. The agency's systemic 
corruption was the icing on the cake, so to speak, 
harnessing the necessary political support for its 
closure.
On the other hand, it would be naTve to think that 
policy makers in Mexico did not know about the 
prevailing discontent in the country's coffee-grow­
ing areas and the potential destabilizing effects of a 
sudden elimination of government support in the 
context of plummeting world prices and continually 
eroding terms of trade from an overvalued peso. 
However genuine their motives, Mexican policy
makers seem to have seriously miscalculated the 
consequences of closing INMECAFE, and this is 
probably why they did close it, so precipitously, 
just at the moment when coffee producers most 
needed support.
Many sectors find government support addictive,8 *
and Mexican coffee producers were no exception. 
Perhaps Mexican government officials failed to 
recognize the magnitude of the dependence that 
INMECAFE had provoked in producers, especially 
the smallest and most vulnerable. Why did they not 
choose to restructure INMECAFE, to make it a 
more transparent and accountable agency, while 
using its valuable network of UEPCs to funnel addi­
tional support to producers? Could not 
INMECAFE have been gradually converted into 
today's Mexican Coffee Council [CMC] [more on 
this to follow], and its support programs gradually 
redesigned to be less distorting? Did Mexican offi­
cials succumb to pressures from international 
financial institutions? Or were they blinded by the 
mirage of benefits that NAFTA was supposed to 
bring?
The Mexican government's attempt to ease the 
crisis had serious flaws and came too late. From 
1989 to 1992, to help the poorest coffee producers 
adjust to the closure of INMECAFE, President 
Carlos Salinas de Gortari established a program to 
support coffee producers, embedded in the 
nationwide pro-poor social development program 
called PRONASOL and implemented by Mexico's 
Institute for Indigenous Peoples [INI], The program 
gave fresh credit for crop maintenance and harvest 
to producers with up to 10 hectares of coffee who 
had paid earlier debts with the government 
[Ontiveros-Ruiz 1995], The program's design, how­
ever, had serious flaws; it covered only the fraction 
of producers that least needed help [that is, the 
ones who had been able to pay their debts]. In 
addition, it failed to tackle the underlying problems 
of low farm prices and dysfunctional market chan­
nels. Furthermore, because coffee prices were often 
below production costs, even eligible producers 
may have decided not to participate. Were credit 
amounts enough? Did disbursements reach
8 Does the continued failure by industrialized nations to
dismantle their US$0.8 billion per day agricultural 
subsidies sound like another case of addiction? See 
Pinstrup-Andersen [2003] for more details.
producers on time? Were producers' transaction 
costs for participation too high?
In 1993 the government created the CMC, a multi­
sectoral policy advisory body in which government 
programs were to be discussed and reviewed.9 It 
was not until 1994/1995, however, that the CMC 
replaced the previous program with one based on 
per-hectare payments. Under this program, called 
Programa Nacional de Apoyo a Productores de 
Cafe (PNAPC), registered producers with fewer 
than 10 hectares of coffee received the equivalent 
of US$200 per hectare (Perez-Grovas et al. 2001). 
Evidently, though, the PNAPC was too little too 
late, at least for Chiapas. The EZLN uprising 
occurred right in the middle of the 1994/1995 
harvest season. Its root causes were too deep and 
its momentum too strong to be halted by such a 
program. Since the program was, by design, 
decoupled from production and required no proof 
of harvest, such payments were most likely used 
for household consumption or debt payment, 
which may have eased discontent. Indeed, it is not 
farfetched to imagine that some producers used 
some of the program's payments to finance the 
guerrillas.
2. Moral or ethical concerns apart, would Mexican 
taxpayers have been willing to see their tax money 
used to support coffee-producing regions in Mexico, 
i f  they had known the socioeconomic situation in 
coffee-producing regions, known that these uprisings 
would occur, and foreseen the magnitude o f the 
political, social, and economic costs that they would 
impose?
The following paragraphs give a rough sketch of 
the social, economic and political costs of the 
uprisings.
In the case of the EZLN, fighting between the 
rebels and the army lasted only a few days. It ended 
when then-President Carlos Salinas de Gortari 
implemented a unilateral cease-fire. But while the
9The CM C consists of representatives of federal agencies 
[Ministy of Agriculture, Ministry of Economy, Ministry 
of Social Development, and Ministry of the Treasury]; 
coffee-producing state governments; producer organi­
zations; and industry, represented by the Mexican Asso­
ciation of Coffee Exporters [Perez-Grovas et al. 2001).
two sides attempted to negotiate an end to the 
standoff, land invasions and often violent retalia­
tions continued for more than a year in Chiapas 
[Darlington 1995). Since then, the army has moved 
deeper into rebel territory, sending rural inhabi­
tants fleeing into the jungle and escalating tension 
throughout the region that continues up to today.
Bose et al. (2001) document the migration effects 
of the coffee crisis and the instability of the 
ensuing uprisings. They cite an estimate by Javier 
Ojeda, president of Mexico's National Coffee 
Producers' Union, that 3 0 ,0 0 0  mostly indigenous 
producers had left the country by 2001 seeking 
work as seasonal laborers. He also refers to a 
report in a "recent" Mexican newspaper estimating 
that 500  families a week were leaving the state of 
Chiapas in search of a livelihood in other states or 
in the United States.
The impacts of the uprisings were also felt at the 
macroeconomic level. In a 2 0 0 4  study of the 
causes of capital flight in Mexico, Diaz-Bautista and 
Olivas-Andrade (2004) found a clear positive cor­
relation with the political events in the first three 
months of 1994. They mention the EZLN and the 
assassination of Luis Donaldo Colosio in March of 
the same year, in the midst of his campaign for the 
presidency. Indeed, many Mexicans link the two 
events: the Zapatista uprising increased Colosio's 
confrontational attitude against Salinas de Gortari, 
the outgoing president, in what had already 
become a distant relationship. A widely held con­
spiracy theory maintains that Salinas de Gortari was 
the mastermind of Colosio's assassination. What is 
certain is that the capital flight provoked by the 
combination of both events was instrumental in the 
ensuing series of major peso devaluations, which 
provoked one of the worst financial crises in 
Mexico's history.10 By 1995 interest rates had risen 
to between 60  and 90  percent, causing the closure 
of thousands of firms in the country. The money 
tunneled to rescue Mexico's banks has cost the 
country dearly tip to this day: the total private 
debt acquired by the government to save the banks 
from bankruptcy— taxpayers' money that is being 
paid to the banks— is roughly equivalent to 16 
percent of GDP (IFAI 2003).
10 For a vivid description of the political and economic 
events that led to Mexico's 1994/1995 financial crisis, see 
Oppenheimer (1996).
Finally, there is no doubt about the political costs 
of the series of concatenated events that the 
Zapatista and EPR uprisings helped bring about: the 
PRI, which had maintained the Mexican presidency 
without interruption for 70 years, lost the elec­
tions in 2 0 0 0  and 2006.
Stakeholders
Stakeholders Directly Involved in the 
Mexican Coffee-Producing Sector
The CMC and the state-level coffee councils consti­
tute the institutional settings in which the different 
stakeholders directly involved in the coffee sector 
discuss and negotiate coffee policies and programs. 
Small producers not affiliated with any organization 
are left out.
The major stakeholders directly involved in the 
coffee sector are coffee producers, industry, and 
the private sector.
C offee p rod ucers. Coffee producers consist of 
small-scale coffee producers not affiliated with an 
organization, small-scale coffee producers affiliated 
with an organization, and large-scale coffee pro­
ducers, most of whom are affiliated with an organi­
zation.
Key producer umbrella organizations are repre­
sented in both the CMC and state-level coffee 
councils. The most important producer organiza­
tions are the Confederacion Nacional Campesina, 
Coordinadora Nacional de Organizaciones 
Cafetaleras, Central Independiente de Obreros 
Agricolas y Campesinos, Confederacion Nacional 
de Propietarios Rurales, and Confederacion 
Mexicana de Productores de Cafe.
In du stry . The domestic market for coffee is highly 
concentrated. Nestle is the largest private buyer 
and toaster of Mexican coffee, and it sells 84 
percent of the instant coffee consumed in Mexico. 
Other important transnationals operating in 
Mexico are Far-Man, J. Aron, Omnicafe, Becafisa, 
TIASA, and Rotphos. Together, they account for 
67 percent of the coffee exported from Mexico.
Industry is represented at the CMC through the 
Mexican Association of Coffee Exporters, an 
umbrella organization.
The p u b lic secto r. Public sector stakeholders in­
clude federal government agencies [Agriculture, 
Economy, Social Development, and Treasury], 
which have a seat at the CMC. According to Perez- 
Grovas et al. [2001], the federal government agen­
cies have "effective hegemony" over the CMC. 
State-level government agencies (usually Agricul­
ture] also have a seat at the CMC and in the cor­
responding state-level coffee councils.
Stakeholders Not Directly Involved in the 
Mexican Coffee-Producing Sector
Other stakeholders are Mexican coffee consumers, 
international coffee consumers (industry and final 
consumers], the Mexican population in general 
(which bears the costs of instability], and taxpayers 
in particular, who knowingly or not, pay to main­
tain the social, economic, and environmental attri­
butes associated with coffee production.
Policy Options
Poverty and social exclusion cannot be solved by 
isolated sector policies. A series of actions need to 
be taken, both nationally and internationally, to 
combat these two evils. Pinstrup-Andersen (2003] 
summarizes them as follows:
• institutional innovation in the international 
arena to help assure accountability, partici­
pation, and empowerment of the poor and 
deal effectively with the international spill­
overs of national actions in such areas as 
trade, environment, health, security, 
poverty, and hunger;
• investments in rural infrastructure [such as 
hospitals, clinics, schools, electricity, roads, 
clean water, drainage];
• investments to improve governance capac­
ity at the domestic and local levels, includ­
ing institutional developments to make 
private markets work in rural areas (such as 
common standards and measures, the 
enforcement of contracts, clear property 
rights];
• social safety nets to help people out of 
hunger and poverty in the short run; and
• the expansion of international development 
assistance, primarily to assist the poor.
Mexican policy makers, and Mexicans as a whole, 
seem to have learned the lessons of the 1990s. 
Poverty and frustrated expectations from an eco­
nomic modernization with no or negative payoffs 
for many inhabitants can trigger a backlash, undo­
ing several years of sound macroeconomic policies 
and market-oriented reforms [Lustig 1998). 
Evidence of this is the Mexican government's sig­
nificant efforts to combat poverty in the past 
decade, especially in rural areas. By 2 0 0 4  public 
spending in social development in Mexico repre­
sented 45 percent of total public spending, and it 
has grown at an average 5.9 percent annually since 
the mid-1990s, compared with 3.1 percent real 
annual growth in total public spending in the same 
period [FIores-AIonso and Barrera Chavira 2004).
Two programs are worth mentioning because of 
their significant impact on poverty alleviation. The 
first is PROCAMPO. Since 1993 roughly 4  million 
farmers have received annual direct per hectare 
payments through the program, at a total cost of 
US$1.3 billion in 2003  [Avalos-Sartorio 2006). The 
second is Oportunidades [which literally means 
"opportunities" and was formerly called 
PROGRESA, "progress"). Since 1997 the program 
has funneled financial resources to women in poor 
households to finance their children's schooling 
and the family's health and basic foodstuff needs. 
The program aims to develop the human capital in 
poor households and to break the vicious cycle of 
malnutrition, morbidity, high infant mortality rates, 
high fertility, high school dropout rates, and 
unhealthy living conditions, which keep people 
trapped in poverty. In 2005 Oportunidades 
reached nearly 5 million households (roughly 20 
percent of all households in Mexico), 80 percent of 
which are located in rural areas, at an annual bud­
getary cost of US $3.5 billion in 2005, nearly 1 
percent of Mexico's GDP (IFPRI 2002; SEDESOL 
2006). It is no coincidence that the program has 
reached 60  percent and 70 percent of the rural 
population in Oaxaca and Chiapas, respectively. 
(Indeed, the program has been so successful that it 
is serving as a model across Latin America.)
Coffee Sector Policies
In spite of such nationwide efforts, coffee pro­
ducers are still mostly poor and continue to face 
considerable obstacles adjusting to the coffee
crisis.!! Technical assistance in the communities is 
inadequate, formal credit is still scarce, and infor­
mal credit is prohibitively expensive. Many pro­
ducers express skepticism about the utility of farm 
organizations, associating producer groups with 
fraud and political manipulation. Lacking a formal 
organizational structure with which to access price 
information and select best buyers, many still hope 
that conditions will improve or that the public 
sector will intervene to provide solutions to their 
situation.
Today, the Mexican government operates a series 
of programs targeting the coffee sector. Among 
these, the flagship coffee program is the Price Sta­
bilization Fund (FEC), a US$80 million permanent 
fund that provides a guaranteed price to producers 
when international prices drop below a pre-estab­
lished floor of US$85 per hundredweight (cwt)1 2 of 
green coffee (CMC 2004). Operated by the 
Mexican Ministry of Agriculture, the FEC provides 
a maximum subsidy of US$20 per cwt of coffee for 
up to 20 cwt per participating producer. In order 
to participate, coffee producers must be registered 
in the National Coffee Census (Padron N ational 
Cafetalero), must sell their coffee to registered 
buyers, and must pick up their subsidy checks in 
person at the designated local government office. 
FEC rules establish a mechanism for maintaining 
the fund. Participating producers commit to 
accepting a discounted price when the international 
price of coffee surpasses US$85. The amount of 
the discount is used to replenish to the fund.13
Unfortunately, the FEC has weaknesses: research by 
Avalos-Sartorio and Blackman (2005) on the impact 
of the FEC in the southern Sierra and coastal 
regions of Oaxaca shows that the guaranteed price 
provided by the program is not nearly high enough 
to cover production and marketing costs for many 
producers. Their results also show that in the
1 This section borrows heavily from Avalos-Sartorio et al. 
(2006).
12 The standard measure of coffee, a cwt is equivalent to 
46 kilograms.
13 The discount varies from US$3 per cwt when the inter­
national price is between US$85 and US$89.50 per cwt 
to US$20 when the international price is US$140 or 
more. To be continuously eligible to participate, pro­
ducers must demonstrate that they have participated in 
the FEC's replenishment in years when international 
prices have exceeded the price ceiling.
2 0 0 2 /2 0 0 3  crop season, the program's second 
year of operation, support reached less than a third 
of producers in that region. Certain types of pro­
ducers consistently chose not to participate, 
presumably because they faced high transaction 
costs [including transporting coffee to the town 
where a registered buyer is located, which is usually 
farther away than the unregistered middleman, and 
commuting to the city, often far from the farm, to 
receive and cash the government check in a bank]. 
Producers in this group included those located 
more than 20 kilometers from the nearest paved 
road [about one-third of the producers in our 
study area], those in towns with an indigenous 
population greater than 20 percent [about one- 
third of the towns in the region], and those in 
towns were women producers represent the major­
ity owing to significant male outmigration [60 
percent of towns in the region]. Logically, these 
findings suggest that to increase participation, 
those responsible for the FEC's design and imple­
mentation must take actions to reduce transaction 
costs of participation, especially for producers 
located far from paved roads, indigenous people, 
and women.
The direct per hectare payments program imple­
mented in 1994/1995 by the CMC is now called the 
Productivity Support Fund [PAP] and has the 
formal objective of promoting productivity 
improvements through fertilization and pruning. 
The PAP has probably not had this effect in prac­
tice, however, because it has no farm-level mechan­
ism for verifying output, so program payments are 
made regardless of whether the producer harvests 
or not [Avalos-Sartorio et al. 2005], One means of 
mitigating this deficiency would be to redirect 
financial resources now used for the PAP to the 
FEC. The additional resources could be used to 
create incentives for producers to enter the 
specialty coffee market by subsidizing certification 
costs. Alternatively, or in addition, producers could 
get an additional price premium for producing sus­
tainable or high-quality coffee, or both, subject to 
some verifiable monitoring mechanism.
In recent years, consumer demand in the developed 
world has given rise to a number of innovative 
strategies to revive the coffee industry. Among 
them, certification schemes for organic, shade- 
grown, and fair trade coffee are the most popular. 
Although Mexico is the world's biggest producer 
of certified organic coffee, so far few producers
have been able to participate in organic and other 
certification-based specialty coffee markets. Fur­
thermore, even such progressive producers face a 
feeble situation. In their evaluation of the impact of 
fair trade and organic certification in Oaxaca, Calo 
and Wise [2005] conclude that, given the current 
price and cost structure of coffee production, 
certification by itself is not sufficient to make 
coffee profitable for most producers. They write 
that "only hard-won government support pro­
grams, in the end, brought producers to a more 
reasonable rate of return from their coffee produc­
tion" [Calo and Wise 2005 , 2], They refer primarily 
to the FEC and the FAP.
Assignment
The assignment is to identify key lessons learned 
for the design and implementation of government 
action in situations similar to the one described in 
this case.
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